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Baxian TREMF Anxieties and Patterns of Norm Entrepreneurship in Canadian-Nigerian
Human Rights Engagements: A Theoretical Overview
By
Obiora Chinedu Okafor*
Abstract
The article argues that the evidence that has been systematically analyzed in the study that
grounds this volume at once support and undermine certain elements of the two theoretical
frameworks that grounded the research: Upendra Baxi’s germinal theory on the emergence to
global dominance of a kind of “trade-related market-friendly human rights” (TREMF)
paradigm/discourse/mentality, and Martha Finnemore and Karthryn Sikikink’s strategic social
constructivist theory on the role of the norm entrepreneur in generating and driving the so-called
human rights “norm life cycles.” The article then suggests, in consequence, that both of these
theoretical frameworks require a (modest) measure of refinement.
A. Introduction:
As suggested in the introduction to this volume, the theoretical questions that framed the multiyear field/desk investigations on which this volume is based, required the contributing
researchers to systematically enquire into: the nature/character of Canadian-Nigerian
engagements in specific human rights sub-areas (democratization, women’s rights, children’s
rights, economic and social rights, and the international criminal law aspect of human rights
institution-building); the attainments of such cooperation, including the extent to which either
country has significantly impacted the other’s human rights praxis; the problems that have
characterized these engagements; and the prospects of such engagements.
As importantly, the co-investigators of the study were also called upon to probe and
ponder the implications of our findings for aspects of constructivist human rights theory
(particularly Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle theory);1 for Upendra Baxi’s theory on the
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See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52
International Organization 887 [Finnemore & Sikkink].
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emergence in our time of a trade-related market friendly (TREMF) human rights paradigm;2 and
for certain theories on human rights and state sovereignty.3 This overview article focuses on the
first two of these theoretical sets of questions, i.e. the norm life cycle and TREMF theories. The
third theoretical framework, on state sovereignty, is dealt with in Zachary Lomo’s contribution to
this volume.
This article therefore attempts to flesh out the implications for each of these two
theoretical frameworks of the evidence revealed by, and analysed as part of, the field/desk
investigations that this volume is based on. To what extent are the norm life cycle and TREMF
theories supported or challenged by the findings of our study? And, thus, to what extent does the
study contribute to the exemplification and/or refinement of the relevant theoretical frameworks?

B. Baxian TREMF Anxieties
The study on which this volume is based appears to have much relevance for Upendra
Baxi’s germinal theory on the emergence to global dominance of a “trade-related marketfriendly” (TREMF) human rights paradigm/discourse. As stated by Baxi himself, his overarching
TREMF theory is that:
“The paradigm of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDH] is being steadily,
but surely, supplanted by that of trade-related, market-friendly human rights. This new
paradigm seeks to reverse the notion that universal human rights are designed for the
attainment of dignity and well-being of human beings and for enhancing the security
and well being of socially, economically and civilisationally vulnerable peoples and
communities.”4
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See Upendra Baxi, The Future of Human Rights (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 131-66 [Baxi].
For example, see Anthony Anghie, “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law” (1996) 5
Social & Legal Studies 321; Anne Orford, International Authority and Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011); Wade M Cole, “Sovereignty Relinquished? Explaining Commitment to the
International Human Rights Covenants, 1966-1999” (2005) 70 Am Soc Rev 472; and Michael Jacobsen & Stephanie
Lawson, “Between Globalization: A Case Study of Human Rights versus State Sovereignty” (1999) 5 Global
Governance 203.
4
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More specifically, in the course of fleshing out his thought-provoking TREMF thesis,
Baxi developed a number of distinguishable but intimately related main sub-claims.5 The first
such sub-claim is that the emergent TREMF paradigm (unlike the UDH paradigm which it is
supplanting) insists on promoting and protecting the collective rights of various formations of
global capital mostly at the direct expense of human beings and communities.6 The second subclaim is that, much more than in the past, the progressive state – or at least the progressive
“Third World” state – is now conceived as one that is a good host state to global capital; as one
that protects global capital against political instability and market failure, usually at a significant
cost to the most vulnerable among its own citizens; and as one that is in reality more accountable
to the IMF and the World Bank than to its own citizens.7 The third Baxian sub-claim is that in
the new global order, a progressive state is also conceived under the TREMF paradigm as a State
that is market efficient in suppressing and de-legitimating the human rights-based practices of
resistance of its own citizens, if necessary in a violent way.8 And the last such sub-claim is that
unlike the UDH paradigm, the TREMF paradigm denies a significant redistributive role to the
State. Here, Baxi argues that, in contrast to the UDH paradigm, the emergent TREMF human
rights paradigm “denies any significant redistributive role to the State; calls upon the State to
free as many spaces for capital as possible, initially by pursuing the three-Ds of contemporary
globalization: deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment.”9

See See Obiora C Okafor, “Assessing Baxi’s Thesis on the Emergence of a Trade-Related Market-Friendly Human
Rights Paradigm: Recent Evidence from Nigerian Labour-led Struggles” (2007) Law, Social Justice and Global
Development, online: <http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2007_1/okafor> [Okafor Baxi].
6
See Baxi, supra note 2 at 132.
7
Ibid at 141.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid at 139. See also Jane Kelsey, “Confronting Trade-Related Human Rights in a GATS-Compatible World”
(2007) 1 Law, Social Justice & Global Development (LGD); and Euan MacDonald, “Review Essay - The Future of
Human Rights? Theory and Practice in an International Context: Review of Upendra Baxi’s The Future of Human
Rights” (2004) 5 German LJ 969.
5
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Teasing out, analytically, the extent to which the politics and orientation of
Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements exemplifies or departs from these four theses will
contribute significantly to a scholarly understanding of the validity or otherwise of Baxi’s
important TREMF theory, as well as to its greater specification and refinement. To what extent is
any aspect of this theory borne out or refuted by the available evidence on Canadian/Nigerian
human rights engagements between 1999 and 2011? For e.g., how exactly, if at all, has the
collective rights of various formations of global capital been protected in the context of
Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements, mostly at the direct expense of human beings and
communities? To what degree has Nigeria (the Third World state in the relationship at issue)
behaved in the manner of the so-called progressive Third World state that aims to become a good
host state to certain formations of global capital by protecting the latter against political
instability and market failure at a significant cost to the most vulnerable among its own citizens,
and to what extent is Canada (the developed country in the mix) implicated in this TREMF-type
behaviour? To what extent has Nigeria acted as the so-called progressive Third World state that
is market efficient in suppressing and de-legitimating the human rights-based practices of
resistance of its own citizens, if necessary in a violent way, and to what degree is Canada
implicated in this behaviour? To what extent has Nigeria bought into the aspect of the TREMF
human rights ideology which requires it to deny any significant redistributive role to the State
and calls upon it to free as many spaces for capital as possible, initially by pursuing the three-Ds
of contemporary globalization: deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment; and to what
degree is Canada implicated in this behaviour? In any case, even if Nigeria has not as yet
behaved in these ways or Canada has not as yet been overtly implicated in such behaviour, has
Canada still given the discerning observer cause for anxiety in this regard? And what are the
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implications of the answers to these and other questions for the validity, exemplication,
specification, refinement or refutation of the Baxian TREMF theory?
The aspect of the TREMF theory that is most directly supported by this study is the subthesis which argues that, in contrast to the UDH paradigm, the emergent TREMF human rights
paradigm denies any significant redistributive role to the State; calls upon the State to free as
many spaces for capital as possible, initially by pursuing the three-Ds of contemporary
globalization: deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment. Against this background, the
question that is raised is, as was suggested earlier, to what extent has Nigeria bought into this
aspect of the TREMF human rights ideology? First, there is little doubt that Nigeria has, at least
for the last sixteen years, bought into this aspect of the TREMF ideology, especially the
relentless pursuit of “the three Ds.” There is also very little reasonable doubt, if any, that this
mentality has negatively affected the behaviour of the Nigerian state toward its own ordinary
citizens, including its inclination or disinclination to protect of certain aspects of their human
rights.10 In an effort to push through its deregulation, denationalization, and disinvestment
(privatization) agenda, the Nigerian state has, at least since 1999, almost consistently adopted a
variety of tactics – at times including those of the strong arm variety – to crush or at least blunt
strong opposition from labour-led social movements in the country to its relentless pursuit of the
three Ds.11 And this has all-too-often led to widespread human rights abuses being committed
against ordinary Nigerians.12
Thus, the only outstanding question here is the extent, if any, to which Canada has been
implicated in this process of the operationalization of the TREMF paradigm in Nigeria. A critical
analysis of the available evidence suggests that there is very little doubt that Canada is to some
10
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extent implicated. For one, there is no question that the governments that ruled Canada between
1999 and 2011 shared a significantly similar privatization ideology with the governments that
were in place in Nigeria around the same period.13 In any case, the incontrovertible fact is that,
over time, the relevant Canadian governments consistently espoused similar ideologies in their
international relations with Nigeria. For example, the Memorandum of Understanding signed by
Canada and Nigeria in April 2012, which established a Bi-National Commission between both
countries, makes the reduction of barriers to economic and commercial relations and investments
one of its central features.14 In effect, this document called on Nigeria and Canada to do all
within their power to “open up their economies to foreign investment by the other”; something
that in the extant Nigerian context invariably includes the privatization of its vast array of state
owned and run corporations. The tone of this document makes it clear that this ambition is, at the
very least, as central to Canadian-Nigerian relations as the promotion and protection of human
rights. As importantly, the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (FIPA)
signed by both countries in 2014 was similarly designed to protect foreign (read Canadian)
investments in both countries (read Nigeria).15 In real life, what was at issue was the protection
of companies like Manitoba Hydro which had recently won a huge and lucrative contract to
manage and expand Nigeria’s electricity transmission grid, as well as other Canadian companies
which were expected to invest in the newly privatized, or soon to be, privatized, electricity
13

For example, the immediate past Prime Minister of Canada, Stephen Harper, a Conservative, has been described
as “the first to conceive of ‘Africa’ as a resource, investment and export market encompassing the [entire]
continent…” see Grant Dawson, “Player, Partner and Friend: Canada’s Africa Policy since 1945” (2013) 50
International Politics 412 at 413 [Dawson]; see also David Black, “Out of Africa? The Harper Government’s New
‘Tilt’ in the Developing World” (2009) 15 Canadian Foreign Policy J 41 at 42.
14
See High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, “Memorandum of Understanding Between the Departments of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria on the Establishment of the Bi-National Commission”, online:
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria/highlightsfaits/2013/BiNationalCommissionNationaleMixte.aspx?lang=en>.
15
See High Commission of Canada in Nigeria, “Canada – Nigeria Relations”, online:
<http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/nigeria_draft/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/canada_nigeria.aspx?lang=en>.
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market. Other areas of the economy – such as the oil and gas, solid minerals, and information
technology industries – have been in play as well. It is, therefore, not surprising that the
Canadian human rights voice, often heard clearly in regard to human rights reform in the
electoral process and child/maternal health areas, has been all but muted with regard to the antiprivatisation struggles waged over the last several years by Nigerian electricity and oil workers,
and by other many other activist groups. In fact current trend tends to be for Canada to replace
once active civil society actors in Africa and elsewhere with corporate actors in furtherance of its
market-driven foreign policy objectives.16 And this has been so despite the huge popularity of
anti-privatization struggles among the vast majority of ordinary citizens in countries like Nigeria
and the often repressive tactics adopted by various Nigerian governments to quieten or crush
such protests.17
Thus, the behaviour of the two countries at issue here clearly exemplifies not just the
aspect of the Baxian TREMF theory under discussion, but also all the other referenced theories.
The behaviour of the two countries also specifies one of the ways in which the TREMF paradigm
circulates and operates in the Nigerian and Canadian contexts. For instance, it is noteworthy that
the interest of certain formations of global capital in reaping the fruits of privatisation in Nigeria
was diligently protected at the expense of the human rights of ordinary Nigerians. Further, for
making this possible, including sometimes through violence, the Nigerian state was ‘rewarded’
by Canada with its relative silence over its repression of the local anti-privatization movement.
This and other evidence also suggests that, at the very least, there is cause for a measure
of Baxian anxiety regarding the motivations and import of Canada’s human rights engagement

See Dragana Bodruzic, “Promoting International Development through Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Canadian Government’s Partnership with Canadian Mining Companies” (2015) 21 Canadian Foreign Policy J 129 at
130.
17
For example, see Okafor Baxi, supra note 5.
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with Nigeria, and the possibility of it being overly attuned to the TREMF ideology. For one, as
has been shown above, it is clear that the interests of Canadian (global) capital are as much at the
heart of Canada’s engagements with Nigeria as are human rights. This fact is also documented in
some of the contributions to this volume, such as the contribution of Uchechukwu Ngwaba to
this volume. On its own, this last observation might seem rather unremarkable. The point though
is that, as Baxi has theorized, attempts by countries like Canada to protect such interests have
almost always had a way of shaping the international relations between most developed and
almost all Third World countries, in ways that have excessively privileged the interests of global
capital over the human rights of the citizens of the relevant Third World states. Against this
background, it is only reasonable to expect that the discerning observer will be anxious about the
possibility that this might be or may become the case in the context of Canadian-Nigerian
relations.
Beyond the evidence of some (somewhat passive) Canadian implication in the real life
circulation and operation of the TREMF ideology in Nigeria and the baseline of understandable
and indeed reasonable anxiety discussed above, there is little else in the specific (and admittedly
limited) body of evidence gathered and analysed in the study on which this volume is based
which explicitly and clearly suggests that the Canadian-Nigerian human rights relationship is
characterized by the kind of steady decline toward the TREMF human rights paradigm that is
predicted by Baxian theory. This should not be surprising given that Baxian theory is not itself
totalising and only goes as far as describing the supplanting of the UDH paradigm by the
TREMF mentality/approach as ongoing and incomplete. As such, the fact that a portion of the
evidence analysed in this particular study does not clearly provide support to the Baxian TREMF
theory does not necessarily invalidate the latter.

8

It should also be noted that even a failure in this one limited study of Canadian-Nigerian
human rights engagements to find as much overt evidence in support of the TREMF theory as
might have been expected does not necessarily mean that no more of such evidence exists. First,
there is a para-politics that tends to frame and constrain such matters and functions to hide the
relevant evidence from view. And secondly, Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements
constitute only a tiny fraction of the set of human rights operations relations that play out in
Nigeria. What is more, at least one previous study did find strong support for the TREMF theory
in the context of intra-Nigerian human rights struggles among labour activists and the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the Federal government of that country.18 And so Baxian
theory is hardly refuted by the evidenced that is analyzed in this volume.
Nevertheless, as is evident from the contribution to this volume by Ifeakandu/Ngwaba,
the important fact remains that a significant portion of the evidence gathered and analyzed in this
study suggests that the UDH-based human rights paradigm described in Baxian theory as being
in the process of being steadily but surely supplanted by the TREMF paradigm has, at least on
the surface, exerted appreciable influence on Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements
(especially in the children’s rights and women’s rights areas). In the light of these findings, it
would seem reasonable to conclude that Baxian TREMF theory would profit from some
tweaking and refinement to allow it to better account for the apparent resilience of the UDH
paradigm in the face of a sustained and robust onslaught by the TREMF ideology on its influence
in human rights praxis. It is important to note that far from calling for repudiation of Baxian
TREMF theory, what is being sought here is merely its refinement to better calibrate and
demarcate the zone of human rights praxis that is still occupied by the UDH paradigm from the
area that has been captured by the emergent TREMF paradigm.
18

Ibid.
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C. Patterns of Norm Entrepreneurship:
In their highly regarded work at the intersection of human rights and constructivist
international relations theory,19 Martha Finnemore and Karthryn Sikkink apply their “strategic
social constructivism” to the human rights area, leading to the development of their theory of the
“norm life cycle;” a theory that argues in favour of the centrality of the agency of the “norm
entrepreneur” in catalyzing human rights change.20 According to these scholars, in the context of
international relations (for e.g. as between Canada and Nigeria), human rights change is
produced when a norm life cycle is completed, in part, as a result of the behaviour/impetus of a
norm entrepreneur. The norm life cycle is “comprised of three linked stages: emergence,
cascade, and internalisation” which are catalyzed by the behaviour of the relevant norm
entrepreneur(s).21 When a ‘critical mass’ of agents has accepted the new ideas as appropriate,
then Finnemore and Sikkink claim that a norm has emerged.22 In the cascade stage, the norm
acceptance rate rapidly increases and a form of norm contagion ensues.23 In the internalisation
stage, the norm becomes taken for granted, and conformance with its dictates is no longer (or at
least rarely) questioned.24 But most importantly, as Hoffman has correctly noted, these scholars
have theorized that:
“Norm entrepreneurs work to persuade other agents to alter their behaviour in
accordance with the norm entrepreneur's ideas of appropriate behaviour. For
constructivists, this means that a norm entrepreneur is attempting to alter other
For an analysis of constructivist international relation theory’s engagements with human rights praxis, see Obiora
C Okafor, The African Human Rights System, Activist Forces and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007) at 23-30 and 57-59 [Okafor].
20
See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 1 at 895; and Okafor, ibid.
21
Ibid. See also Hannah Entwisle, “Tracing Cascades: The Normative Development of the UN Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement” (2004-2005) 19 Georgetown Immigration LJ 369; and Matthew J Hoffmann,
“Entrepreneurs and Norm Dynamics: An Agent-Based Model of the Norm Life Cycle” (Department of Political
Science and International Relations, University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware), online:
<http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop/articles/hoffman091200.pdf> [Hoffman].
22
See Finnemore & Sikkink, ibid; and Hoffman, ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
19
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agents' perceptions of the social context—alter what an agent thinks is appropriate
behavior. How this alteration takes place is currently a matter for debate among
constructivists (see, e.g. Checkel 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).”25

To what extent is any aspect of this theory borne out or refuted by the available evidence on
Canadian/Nigerian human rights engagements? For e.g., how exactly, if at all, has the norm life
cycle played out in the context of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements? How exactly,
if at all, has the process of human rights norm entrepreneurship proceeded in that context? Who
has the “norm entrepreneur” and “norm follower” tended to be? And what are the implications of
the answers to these and other questions for scholarly knowledge, including in relation to the
possible exemplication, refinement or refutation of the relevant theory?
From the evidence gathered and analysed in this study, it appears that the aspect of
Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm life cycle theory that is most relevant to the context of CanadianNigerian human rights engagements is its sub-thesis on the important role played by so-called
“norm entrepreneurs” in persuading/cajoling/pushing so-called norm followers to embrace and
thereafter internalize a human rights norm. The word “seduction”26 has been used to describe this
interest in a larger African context. It is framed as a situation in which Canadian governments
“believed that Canada had something to offer and wanted to help Africans…”27
Most significantly, the evidence analyzed in this study/volume clearly supports this subthesis. For example, Ngwaba has documented the very active role that Canada has made and the
25

See Hoffman, supra note 21.
See Dawson, supra note 13 at 413.
27
Ibid at 414; see also David Black, “Echoes of Apartheid? Canada, Nigeria, and the Politics of Norms” in Rosalind
Irwin, ed, Ethics and Security in Canadian Foreign Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001) 138; David Black, “The
Long and Winding Road: International Norms and Domestic Political Change in South Africa” in Thomas Risse,
Stephen Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink, eds, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 78. Sometimes this includes the attachment of human rights
conditions to development aid funds; see for example Stephen Brown, “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion:
Lessons from Africa” (2005) 17 European J Development Research 179 at 182; Joel Barkan, “Can Established
Democracies Nurture Democracy Abroad? Lessons from Africa” in Axel Hadenius, ed, Democracy’s Victory and
Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 371.
26
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extensive financial contributions that it has made (both as a state actor and through various
intermediaries)28 toward the improvement of the electoral process in Nigeria and the securement
of the fuller enjoyment of the right to vote in that country.29 Financial leverage over Nigeria has
allowed Canada to persuade/cajole/push the electoral authorities and the government toward the
desired objectives. Ngwaba has also highlighted the role played by the Canada-Africa
Parliamentary Association in engaging Nigerian parliamentarians toward the improvement of the
local electoral process, etc. As importantly, Ifeakandu and Ngwaba have in their joint article
documented a similar pattern of norm entrepreneurship backed by significant financial
investments by Canada with respect to the enjoyment of children’s rights in Nigeria. And as
significantly, the joint contribution to this volume by Effoduh and Bissallah also makes it clear
that “Canada has pushed a lot” for the enjoyment of economic and social rights in Nigeria,
particularly in the health and poverty reduction areas. Thus, a very substantial exemplication of a
key aspect of Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory is strongly suggested by the findings of the study
on which this volume is based.
Notice, however, that given the fact that the norm entrepreneurs described in, and
envisaged by, Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory are in fact (strictly speaking) human rights
activists who function under the auspices of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil
society organizations (CSOs), the very substantial exemplication of this aspect of their theory
that is provided by the evidence collected and analyzed in this study is still somewhat partial.
Thus, in the specific context of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements, it is a state actor
28

Such intermediaries could include non-governmental civil society organizations that extend their activities
throughout the African continent. See for example Charles Quist-Adade & Anita van Wyk, “The Role of NGOs in
Canada and the USA in the Transformation of the Socio-Cultural Structures in Africa” (2007) 32 Africa
Development 66 at 69; see also James Petras, “NGOs: In the Service of Imperialism” (1999) 29 J Contemporary
Asia 429 at 431.
29
For possible reasons why Canada commits to the promotion of democratic governance abroad, see Jeremy Martin
Ladd, “Contemporary Developments in Canadian Democracy Promotion and the Way Forward” (2014) 20 Canadian
Foreign Policy J 209 at 210.
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(including through its agents and intermediaries), as opposed to non-governmental organization
(NGO) and civil society organization (CSO) actors, which has largely functioned as the norm
entrepreneur in relation to the other State at issue. In Finnemore and Sikkink’s parlance, the
relevant State has thus served as both a norm entrepreneur and “norm leader” (the latter term
being used by Finnemore and Sikkink to denote a State that pushes other States to embrace and
internalize a norm having itself been pushed by NGO and CSO norm entrepreneurs). This is not
to contend, however, that NGO and CSO actors have been totally absent from the ensuing
international relations “game.” Rather, in spite of the participation of these NGO and CSO actors
in that “game” the norm entrepreneurial role of the relevant State has nevertheless loomed very
large. For example, while the Canada-Africa Parliamentary Association, the Gender Equality
Network, and the Canadian Labour Congress (all non-governmental groups) have, to a degree,
played important roles in the process of Canadian norm entrepreneurship in Nigeria, it is
governmental bodies such as the recently defunct CIDA and the Canadian High Commission in
Nigeria that have engaged the most in such entrepreneurial activities. The theoretical implication
here is that – as generally accurate as the theory is – it could still be tweaked/modified a
significant bit, and thus refined, so as to allow it to better account for this very specific but
nevertheless important character of the Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagement experience.
It is also clear from the analysis of the evidence that is analyzed in this study/volume
that the kind of norm entrepreneurship that has been a feature of the Canadian-Nigerian human
rights engagement experience has tended to proceed in a kind of one-way traffic.30 To be precise,
While Canada that has tended to act the role and wear the toga of the norm entrepreneur Nigeria

30

On the issue of the one-way human rights traffic that tends to characterize engagements between more powerful
Western countries (such as Canada) and Third World states (such as Nigeria), see Obiora C Okafor and Shedrack C
Agbakwa,”On Legalism, Popular Agency and ‘Voices of Suffering’: The Nigerian National Human Rights
Commission in Context” (2002) 24:3 Hum Rts Q 662.
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tended to almost always function as the norm follower.31 This key feature of Canadian-Nigerian
human rights engagements is for example revealed by Uchechukwu Ngwaba’s contribution to
this volume. The feature also comes through in almost all the other contributions to this volume.
Similarly, this feature is also much in keeping with Canada’s global reputation as a norm
entrepreneur in the human rights area; a phenomenon that is mapped and analyzed in this volume
by Basil Ugochukwu. This is not to say, however, that Nigeria has never acted as a human rights
norm entrepreneur in its relationship with Canada. It has definitely done so. For example, in the
context of the defunct UN Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council), a
body with which Canada has had a long history of participation and association, Nigeria did
provide very strong leadership with respect to the development of the Commission’s mandate on
the negative effects on the enjoyment of human rights of the dumping of hazardous
waste/substances. This work has now led to “an alteration in the [global] logic of
appropriateness” with regard to this sort of activity.32 What is more, as Dakas C.J. Dakas and
Udoka Owie demonstrate in their contribution to this volume, Nigeria has also provided
significant leadership in the development of international human rights law in general. For
example, as these scholars have shown, Nigeria’s leadership has been quite robust with respect to
the struggle against apartheid and colonialism, and the regulation of the global arms trade, and
the development and strengthening of the human rights mandates of various international bodies
(especially the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States). Thus, our
analysis in the study at issue of the nature of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements calls
For examples of other studies that conform this conclusion, see Rhoda Howard-Hassman, “The Flogging of
Bariya Magazu: Nigerian Politics, Canadian Pressures, and Women’s and Children’s Rights” (2004) 3 J Hum Rts 3;
and Sonia Cardenas, “Transgovernmental Activism: Canada’s Role in Promoting National Human Rights
Commissions” (2003) 25 Hum Rts Q 775; Steven Finkel, “Can Democracy be Taught?” (2003) 14 J Democracy
137.
32
For example, see Cyril U Gwam, “Toxic Waste Dumping and the Enjoyment of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights in Africa” (2007) 15 African Yearbook of Int’ l L 237.
31
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for the modification and refinement of Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory of the norm life cycle in
order to take far greater account of, and better internalize, the ways in which that process,
powered as it largely is by Western norm entrepreneurs/leaders, reproduces the generally
problematic global power relations that have been at the centre of the development of
international human rights law since its beginning.
The precise extent to which this one way traffic has been generated simply by the nature
of the “objective” need, (i.e. the comparative prevalence of human rights violations in Nigeria
and its relative absence in Canada), as opposed to more ideological and power-related factors
(such as the prevalent mentality that views the world as divided into a West which tends to be a
human rights heaven and the Third World that is largely a human rights hell), or even by both
sets of factors functioning in concert, is somewhat hard to pin point. However, what is clear is
that, considering that all of these factors have always been incontrovertibly present in the mix of
forces that have shaped Canadian-Nigerian (and Canadian-Third World) relations for ages,33 it
will be difficult to conclude that the one-way traffic character of norm entrepreneurship in the
experience of Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements is somehow the pure result of an
objective need for Canadian intervention in Nigerian affairs. Here again, nothing less than a
refinement of the theory at issue is suggested. There is a need for Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm
life cycle theoretical framework to better account for and internalize the ideological and powerrelations factors which drive and have always driven human rights engagements across the
global North-South divide. For example, these factors closely affect who can become an
acknowledged norm entrepreneur and in what contexts.

33

For example, see Edward A Akuffo, Canadian Foreign Policy in Africa: Regional Approaches to Peace, Security,
and Development (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012).
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D. Conclusion:
The article argues that, as geo-politically limited as it necessarily is, the body of evidence
analyzed in the study that grounds this volume both exemplifies and challenges aspects of the
two theoretical frameworks that grounded the research: that is, Upendra Baxi’s germinal theory
on the emergence to global dominance of a kind of “trade-related market-friendly human rights”
(TREMF) paradigm/discourse/mentality, and Martha Finnemore and Karthryn Sikikink’s
strategic social constructivist theory on the role of the norm entrepreneur in generating and
driving the so-called norm life cycles through which human rights norms can often go from the
margins of international socio-political life to the warm(er) embrace of the leaders/peoples of
many a country/society.
As such, as validated as both theoretical models appear to have been in the specific
context of our analysis in this volume of the evidence gathered from our study of the workings of
Canadian-Nigerian human rights engagements, each of these theories still need a measure of
refinement if they are to better account for specificities and particularities of this relationship.
Needless to say, this process of refinement will deepen and strengthen these theories. And
therein lies the main contributions of this study/volume to human rights theory and knowledge.
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